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George H. W. Bush and the SemiInstitutional Vice Presidency
Jack Lechelt
University of South Carolina
While serving as Vice President in the two Reagan Administrations , George H. W. Bush was actively involved
in the formulation
and execution of foreign policy . Bush's
prominent profile and contributions
were made possible ,
in part , by th e recently augmented
reso urces , influence
and prestige
of his office , here t ermed the semiinstitutionalization
of the vice presidency.
This article
briefly recounts the origins, describes the nature , and by
examining the conduct of Bush , explains the significance,
of this ph enomenon .

his article examines the roles played by George Herbert
Walker Bush in the area of foreign policy while Vice
President during the two Reagan Administrations. 1 I will
show that his substantial activities and significant contributions were made possible, in 110 small part, by the recently augmented resources , influence, and prestige of his office, which I
term the "semi-institutional vice presidency." This institutional
development has resulted from a number of factors, most significantly the increasing complexity of the international environment, the growth of the presidency, and the establishment of

T
1

Three biographical sources offer thorough discussions of Bush's life and political career. 1l1e most laudatory comes from Bush's 1988 presidential campaign autobiography,
looking Fo,ward. A more critical examination is offered by Bob Woodward and Walter
Pincus in an occasional series of five articles for the Washington Post 's I988 election
coverage; the series is titled "George Bush: Man and Politician," and ran from August 7
to August 11. Retrieved February 11, 2004 from LexisNexis. See also Herbert Parmet's
balanced biography, George Bush: The life of a lone Star Yankee (200 1).
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precedents between President Jimmy Carter and Vice President
Walter Mondale. These precedents have increased the likelihood
that vice presidents will work in close proximity to their presidents, take on more important assignments, and have more influence over foreign policy.
Even with these changes, the vice presidency remains unique.
Statutory guidance for the office is minimal, and it does not have
a significant bureaucracy attached to it. The qualifying prefix in
the term "semi-institutional vice presidency" acknowledges this
uniqueness, and also recognizes two limits on the full-fledged
institutionalization of the office.2 These limitations are important, but should not be exaggerated. The first is that presidents
have options in determining how they will utilize their vice
presidents. It is unlikely, however, that modem Presidents would
completely ignore their Vice Presidents, if only because, as
Ronald Reagan rhetorically asked, "Why .. .let able-bodied manpower sit by?" 3 Rather than consider if presidents will use their
vice presidents, presidents are increasingly likely to consider
how they will use them. The second limitation is that vice presidents can help or hurt their standings within an administration.
Of course, this is also true for every Cabinet official and staff
member. However, unlike Cabinet members and staff, there is no
mechanism for a president to fire a vice president. 4 More impor2

Referring to the presidency, Ragsdale and Theis (1997, 1280) wrote that "institutionalization ... involves the process by which the office as an organization attains stability and
value as an end in itself. Stability denotes that the entity cannot be easily altered or eliminated, while value involves the entity acquiring a distinctive identity ." Although the vice
presidency approaches this definition of institutionalization, it cannot acquire levels of
stability and value that the presidency possesses.
3
Reagan, R. 1988. Interview by Lou Cannon. Washington Post . Retrieved June 4, 2005
from LexisNexis.
• Vice presidents can be impeached and removed from office by Congress, but the president has no role in this procedure ; on the other hand, presidents can seek to remove a vice
president from the ticket in a re-election campaign .
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tantly, vice presidents are ordinarily motivated to serve their
presidents well. Indeed, they are often eager to reach the presidency and, recognizing that presidents are titular heads of their
party and can have a large impact on nominations, vice presidents are motivated both to perform well in office and avoid becoming a nuisance to the man most responsible for their career
ambitions. In light of this, George Bush worked hard to attain
and maintain a positive relationship with Ronald Reagan, a fact
particularly evident in Bush's performance in response to the
assassination attempt on Reagan.
As we will see, George Bush's tenure as vice president serves
as a useful case study for the semi-institutional vice presidency.
Unlike Mondale, Bush competed for his party's presidential
nomination against the president he ended up serving. Furthermore , Bush hailed from the moderate wing of the Republican
Party, whereas Reagan was closely aligned with the conservative
wing. Finally, Reagan had a number of close confidantes who
either followed him from his home state of California or had
proven themselves staunch coP.servatives. Given the recent competition between the two men and their ideological (and other)
differences, the fact that Bush was as active as he was in the
Reagan administration provides striking evidence for the importance of the recently developed semi-institutionalization of the
office.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SEMI- INSTITUTIONAL VICE PRESIDENCY

More distant factors in the development of the semiinstitutional vice presidency concern the increasing complexity
of the international system and the consequent effects it has had
on the presidency. Edward Morse (1970) provides a useful account of this complexity , pointing out, for instance, that high polVOL.
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icy issues such as national security and military matters have
become increasingly intermingled with low policy issues like
trade and economic policies. In addition, the distinction between
foreign and domestic policy has weakened, leading to what one
scholar has termed " intermestic affairs" (Manning 1977). As a
result of such developments, the ability of presidents to control
events became increasingly attenuated and this, in turn, contributed to the rise of the primacy of the presidency, especially in
foreign affairs (Manning 1977). Yet the rising prominence and
power of presidents has had the paradoxical effect of making it
more difficult for them to handle all of their responsibilities.
Given their desire to steer policy in their preferred direction and
to control the bureaucracy, presidents have looked for help wherever they could find it. The vice presidency was a logical place
for them to turn. 5
Added to these larger environmental factors were the more
recent events of the Vietnam War and Watergate, and the presidency of Jimmy Carter. As a candidate for the office, Carter's
status as a Washington outsider proved advantageous against the
background of these recent national traumas. But neither that
status, nor his lack of national experience, would serve Carter
well once in office. To his credit, Carter recognized his dearth of
Washington experience, and he intended to make up for it with
the vice presidency: "I had made only one early decision about
the Vice President-that
it was important for me to choose a
member of Congress as my running mate in order to provide
some balance of experience to our ticket. Without ever having
s Many years ago, Paul T. David (I 967, 721) recognized the likelihood of presidents
turning to their vice presidents : "the increasing recognition of the Vice Presidency reflects the hazards of the present world situation , in which the Vice President may be
called upon at any time to take over as commander -in-chief, as well as the growing burdens on the time and strength of the President as chief executive, leader of his political
party, and chiefof state."
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served in Washington myself, I needed someone who was familiar with the federal government and particularly with the legislative branch" (Carter, 1982, 35).
From that decision and the eventual selection of Walter Mondale, a Senator from Minnesota, as Carter's running mate, Carter
and Mondale agreed on key components of the new vice presidency. These new components, or precedents, were followed by
all of their successors. First, the vice president was going to have
an office in the West Wing of the White House, on the assumption that proximity to the president is power. Second, the vice
president would have weekly private lunches with the president:
no formal agendas, no other staff. Third, the vice president
would be included in all paperwork loops, outgoing from the
president and incoming to the president. Fourth, the vice president would be allowed to attend any meeting he wanted to attend. Fifth, no specific tasks or commissions would be forced on
the vice president; he would be a general advisor to the president. Sixth, to secure these ambitious goals, the vice president
would be given a budget line-item and the necessary staffing.
These changes to the office of the vice presidency were monumental, particularly for an office once described by a former occupant, John Nance Gamer , as not being worth a bucket of spit.
The establishment of precedents is important for understanding much that occurs in and around the presidency, including the
vice presidency. Cass Sunstein has compared such precedents, or
"practices," to the changing common law judicia l interpretations
of the Constitution, contending that the presidency has become
more prominent over the years based on this sort of change. His
point is that "common law constitutionalism occurs outside the
judiciary. The development of these practices and understandings
resembles the process of common law development. It is recognized that a certain practice 'works'; Congress and the President
endorse the practice; and the practice therefore operates as a
VOL. 33 2005

90

LECHELT

guide for the future" (Sunstein, 1995, 15). Joel K. Goldstein
( 1995, 560) has applied the point to the vice presidency: "Once
one President gives his Vice President a weekly private appointment ...it becomes difficult for other Presidents not to follow
suit. These practices when repeated once or twice create settled
expectations." Paul David (1967, 721) has similarly observed
that the "functions, duties, and prerogatives of vice presidents
are not likely to expand without presidential authorization, but
once the authorization has been granted, it is more difficult to
withdraw the grant of expanded prerogatives." Since Carter and
Mondale, the practices discussed here have been repeated four
times, by Reagan-Bush, Bush-Quayle, Clinton-Gore, and BushCheney.
Carter and Mondale left office after four years in an embarrassing defeat to another Washington outsider, Ronald Reagan.
The two presidents, Carter and Reagan, could hardly have been
more different politically or as managers. Carter was a hands-on
devourer of detail; Reagan, in contrast, delegated many important tasks. Despite his desire to change many government processes, Reagan continued the Carter-Mondale precedents with his
own vice president, George Bush. Bush also wanted to follow
the "Mondale Model" of the newly-enhanced vice presidency.
"My conclusion," he said after examining the Mondale experience, "is that the Mondale model is a very good model." 6 In fact,
Bush credited Carter and Mondale with making the important
changes that he, Bush , benefited from (Smith, 1981, 28). 7 In deciding to carry on the Carter-Mondale model, Reagan and Bush
reinforced the semi-institutionalization of the vice presidency.

6

Rosenbaum, D. E. 1981. "Bush Plans to Emulate Mondale Role," New York Times, 28
October, p. B-3.
7
Smith, H. 1981. "Bush says he Sought to Avoid Acting like Surrogate President," New
York Times, 12 April, pp. I & 28.
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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Perhaps no president in modern American history is more difficult to understand than Ronald Reagan. His inner thoughts and
feelings and the degree to which he allowed himself to be influenced by those around him have baffled many peop1e.8 Pulitzer
Prize-winning biographer Edmund Morris (1999, 579), personally picked by Reagan to write his biography, was granted a great
deal of access to him and still found that Reagan "remained a
mystery." Specific aspects of Reagan's management style also
make understanding his presidency difficult. First, Reagan delegated extensively, believing that delegation was "the cornerstone
of good management: Set clear goals and appoint good people to
help you achieve them" (Reagan, 1990, 161). But clarity was not
always achieved; as Martin Anderson (1988, 291) noted, "Because [Reagan did] not actively and constantly search out and
demand things, he must rely on what is or is not brought to him."
Second, Reagan's less-than-direct means of discussing the specifics of important foreign policy positions often caused friction
among staff. In dealing with such weighty issues as Central
America, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, there always
appeared to be two different schools or teams fighting each other
for control of policy. One team represented the California conservatives, normally considered to be closer to Reagan's heart. 9
On the other side were pragmatic/realist/moderates often struggling to claim they represented Reagan's best interests, if not his
8

Lou Cannon (2000 , 144), in the single most useful and authoritative book on the Reagan
presidency. wrote the following : "While Reagan was still in the White House , dismissed
or disenchanted former members of his Cabinet and staff produced ten memoirs that
renect the frustrations of those who made the mistake of trying to breach the personal
barrier ... [T]he memoirs find Reagan a puzzlement. "
9
The conservatives included Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, National Security
Advisor William Clark , Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, and United Nations Ambassador Jeane i(irkpatrick .
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true desires: George Bush hailed from that camp. 10 Because
Reagan failed to resolve or even oversee these factions and conflicts, it is often hard to discern his foreign policy goals and priorities.
Added to the difficulties of understanding the Reagan presidency was Bush's preference for keeping his personal views as
vice president to himself. Bush believed that the advice he gave
to the president should be shared with no one. 11 No doubt this
stance helped Bush retain Reagan's confidence; however, it
makes understanding their relationship more difficult.
Although Bush had impressive foreign policy credentials, especially compared to Reagan's limited experience with international affairs, Bush had reason to wonder if he was going to be
accepted into Reagan's inner sanctum. Reagan and Bush ended
up on the same ticket after initially opposing each other in a
fairly long and acrimonious fight for the 1980 GOP nomination
(Untermeyer, 1997, 157). If any president and vice president
were likely to have difficulties working together, it would be
Reagan and Bush-and Reagan would not be the one kept out of
the loop. Yet Reagan held no grudge and accepted Bush into the
team. One important component of Reagan's personality, as
noted by Martin Anderson (1998 , 288), was his "inherent humility": "he [was] not an arrogant or haughty man." 12
10
Those in the pragmatic camp included Secretary of State George Shultz, National Security Adviser [NSAJ Robert Mcfarlane , Chief of Staff James Baker, Deputy Chief of
Staff Michael Deaver , and First Lady Nancy Reagan . Shultz became Secretary of State in
1982 after Alexand er Haig resigned . McFarlane was one of six NSAs , but he was an
important part of U.S.-Soviet policy and Iran-Contra .
11
Chapters nine and ten of Bush ' s (1988) autobiography deal with his positions on advising the President. Herbert Parmet (200 I, 258) wrote about the difficulties of understanding Bush's vice presidency : "The last place to learn about the Bush-Reagan relationship
would be by listening to George Bush ."
12
Any difficulties Bush suffered within the Administration came not from Reagan, but
from his tightly knit conservative associate s. After one successful trip to Europe in 1983,
and just prior to another trip to Europe in the summer of that same year , conservatives
Note continues on next page .
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By maintaining the precedents established by Carter/Mondale,
Reagan and Bush were able to build a stronger relationship.
Their weekly lunches, according to Bush's national security adviser, Donald Gregg, gave them the opportunity to get to know
each other: they enjoyed each other's sense of humor and there
was a great deal of mutual respect (D. Gregg, personal communication June 3, 2005). Moreover, Bush's office in the West
Wing helped ensure that he kept in close contact with the President personally and through the flow of information coming
from and going to the President.
Reagan made another decision that enhanced Bush's prospects by choosing James Baker ill to be the White House chief
of staff. This Reagan did despite the fact that Baker was Bush's
presidential campaign chief-against Reagan in the 1980 GOP
primaries. Moreover, Bush and Baker were both from Texas and
close friends. Although the California conservatives distrusted
Baker, Reagan's appointment of him as the new chief of staff
allowed the Vice President to have an additional channel to the
President. 13 In addition, Bush was well-respected by Deputy
Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver, perhaps Reagan's closest assistant.14Bush also made a helpful staff choice: in 1985, Craig

were rein forcing the notion that Bush was not a true conservative. At the time, rumors
spread that Reagan might not run for reelection . Even with the critiques from the right,
many recogni zed that Bush would be the nominee in place of Reagan . Reagan made sure
the con servatives recognized Bush ' s importance by declaring at a political event that
"when I needed someone of unquestionable leadership , loyalty and skill there is only one
person I could or would choose again, and that 's my partner and your Vice President ,
George Bush" (Gailey, P. I 983 . "A Star who shines brightly in Reagan 's Shadow ," New
York Times. Retrieved June 6, 2005 from LexisNexis).
13
Lou Cannon (2000 . 267) wrote that Baker and Bush "oflen worked in concert "- and
this included work on foreign policy.
14
Deaver occupied a position far closer to the President than anyone save Nancy Reagan .
Deaver was one-third of the "troika" tliat worked most closely with President Reagan
throughout his first term (Baker and Meese made up the other two-thirds) . According to
Note continue s on next page .
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Fuller became Bush's vice presidential chief of staff. Fuller had
long ties to Reagan, stretching back to 1973, and even longer ties
to Michael Deaver. 15 Fuller was included in top staff meetings
and maintained close contact with Reagan's second chief of staff,
Donald Regan. 16
To handle the large workload that confronts all presidents,
Reagan believed that Cabinet government was going to be his
best organizational management model. The idea that the President serves as a chairman of the board over a system that can
carry out the decisions of the chief decision-maker has likely
been the hope of every president; the reality, however, dictates a
much more difficult process. To better enable the Cabinet to operate efficiently, Reagan aide Ed Meese created "Cabinet councils," which were smaller policy-focused Cabinet sub-sets.
Reagan was the chairman of all councils and Bush, Meese, and
Baker were "ex officio members of every council" (Anderson,
1988, 230). 11 Anderson (1988, 230) describes the Cabinet councils as ''the main policy chokepoint, a place where new ideas
could be introduced, good ideas encouraged, and bad ideas
sunk." Although this Cabinet council system dealt mostly with
domestic pol icy, Reagan's domestic political staff was often
heavily involved in foreign policy. And Reagan's extensive use
of delegating was actually more evident in foreign policy, where
he gave experts a freer hand than he did with domestic policy
(Anderson, 1988, 306- 7; 309).

Deaver (1987, 94) Bush was a "class person " and Deaver ' s preference for the vice presidential nomination.
15
Boyd, G. M. 1985. "Craig L. Fuller, the Vice President ' s New Right-hand Man," New
York Times. Retrieved June 6, 2005 from LexisNexis .
16

Ibid .
Anderson adds that "Bush, Meese , and Baker rarely attended the meeting s of the Cabinet councils unless the discussions reached a fairly critical stage. They largely left it to
me to represent the president's views during the discussions ."
17
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Martin Anderson (1988, 312) credits Richard Allen, Reagan's
first national security adviser, as "the most important player in
the formulation and shaping of Reagan 's early foreign policy."
Anderson went on to list the' traditional" members of Reagan's
first foreign policy "directorate," which included Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger,
and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. Also included in the directorate were United Nations Ambassador
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Ed Meese, Jim Baker, Michael Deaver , and
Vice President George Bush. Anderson (1988 , 313) states that
Reagan drew "Bush deep into the inner sanctums, virtually letting him sit by his side as he conducted his presidency." Anderson credits Haig and Allen as having "dominated" foreign policy
in the early Reagan Administration, but Bush, Meese, Deaver,
and Baker served, he claims , as "powerful and effective" checks
in the foreign policy domain. In fact, in 1981 Reagan declared
that Bush was to be in charge of the Crisis Management Team
(eventually renamed the Special Situations Group [SSG]). The
SSG was an inter-departmental group responsible for emergency
foreign policy coordination (Parmet , 2001 , 266). As will be explained below , the SSG and Bush's leadership of the group were
important components in some of the Reagan Administration's
more memorable crises.
Bush also boosted his usefulness to the Reagan team by
maintaining extra channels of communication between the Administration and Congress. As a former member of the House of
Representatives and as the President of the Senate, Bush worked
hard and on the whole successfully to maintain positive relations
18
with both houses of Congress.
18
Reston , J. 1985. "The Quiet Survivo r," New York Times, 16 January, p. A-23 . Smith,
H. 1981. " Bush says he Sought to Avoid Acting like Surrogate President ," New York
Times, 12 April, pp. I .J:.28.

VOL.

33 2005

96

LECHELT
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

To better appreciate Vice President Bush 's activities in the
Reagan White House and the actual working s of the semiinstitutional vice pre sidency, it is necessary to examine certain
events and policy arenas. The first major event of the Reagan
Administration, which helped solidify Bush 's place on the
Reagan team, was the assassination attempt on President Reagan .
Reagan and Bush had been in office less than three months
when , on March 30, 1981, John Hinckley attempted to kill President Reagan on the streets of Washington , DC. After the shooting, the White House was enmeshed in chaos. Most of the
Cabinet and top presidential aides were gathered in and around
the White House Situation Room . At one point in the afternoon ,
Secretary of State Haig rushed up to the press room to answer
questions from the med ia. A famou s video clip shows Haig stating that, "Constitutionally , gentleman , you have the President,
the Vice President , and the Secretary of State, in that order . . .. As
of now, I am in control here , in the White House , pending return
of the Vice President " (Haig , 1984, 60). Media editing showed
an out-of-breath Haig claiming " I am in control here." Fair or
not, this did not help his standing in the press , nor within the
Administration.
In contrast to Haig , Vice President Bu sh exhibited measured
poise, and made the most of this unexpected opportunity to further endear himself to Reagan and the President's intimates.
Upon reaching Andrews Air Force Base ju st outside of Washington, Bush was told that it would be quicker for him to take a
helicopter directly to the White House . Bush 's handlers undoubtedly recognized that a South Lawn White House landing would
make the Vice President look more presidential, but Bush declined, retorting, "only the President lands on the South Lawn ."
Similarly, in order to show that the government was operating
without a glitch , a Cabinet meeting was held the next day chaired
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by Bush, but he pointedly refused to sit in the President's chair.
Symbolic actions perhaps, but Bush seemingly enhanced his
standing within the Administration through such behavior. Even
prior to the shooting, however, Bush was apparently ingratiating
himself with the President; based on Presidential Daily Diaries
from the first two weeks of February 1981, Bush spent more
time in the presence of Reagan than did any other foreign policy
19
official.
THE SOVIET UNION

From President Harry Truman in the 1940s, to President
Reagan in the 1980s, no nation in the world received more attention in American foreign policy than the Soviet Union. As an
advisor to the President, diplomat, and back-door political operator, Vice President Bush played important roles in the Reagan
Administration's efforts to deal with America's major foe in the
decades' long Cold War. Bush's loyalty to Reagan allowed the
more moderate vice president to ably serve his conservative
president in an area of foreign policy in which Reagan held
strong convictions. 20
19
Tabulations of minutes from February 2, 1981 through February 13, 1981 (Monday
through Friday) show that Bush was at meetings, functions , or ceremonies with Reagan
for a total of I, I 87 minutes . Others in foreign policy : R. Allen, NSA (876) ; A. Haig,
Secretary of State (504); C . Weinberger , Secretary of Defense (493) ; W. Casey, Director
of Central Intelligence (493) ; J. Kirkpatrick, UN Ambassador (121 ); and D. Jones ,
Chairman of the Joint Chief s of Staff (90) . In fact, Bush ' s time rivals that of Reagan ' s
closest advisers : James Baker ( 1,619) ; Ed Meese (1,324) ; and Michael Deaver (955) .
(Presidential Diary , Feb . 2 through Feb . 5, 1981, folder "The President's Daily Diary
( 1/27/8 I -2/5/8 I]," Ronald Reagan Library ; Presidential Diary, Feb . 6 through Feb. I 3,
198 I, folder "The President ' s Daily Diary [2/6/81-2/ 16/8 I) ," Ronald Reagan Library) . 1
started in February under the assumption that January 1981 would be filled with inaugural-related ceremonial activities .
20
I con sulted many sources in attempting to understand the Reagan administration's
approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and George Bush ' s role in that approach . The
Reagan presidential biography by Cannon and the Bush biography by Parmet are useful ,
Note continues on next page .
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Prior Republican administrations, led by Presidents Nixon
and Ford and their foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger, preferred the realist policy of detente; both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
could coexist peacefully through a balance of power and the use
of treaties to maintain that balance. For Reagan, detente cast
moral acceptance on communism and the "evil empire" of the
Soviet Union; he also believed that treaties held limited value
because the Soviets could cheat too easily. Instead, Reagan
wanted the U.S. to build up its military defenses and approach
negotiations with the Soviets from a position of strength; when
the Soviets came to recognize that they could not keep up with
the mighty capitalistic military build-up of America, they would
be far more willing to enter into agreements that were more advantage ous to the U.S., and less likely to cheat once they did so.
Hence Reagan was not inherently opposed to entering into treaties with the Soviets despite some of his rhetoric and conservative foreign policy outlook, a position that often annoyed the
more conservative members in his Administration.
In 1981, at the start of the Reagan Administration, the military was accordingly infused with funding for Reagan's promised buildup. Within a few years, Reagan began to look for
openings with which to approach the Soviets. With the help of
Secretary of State George Shultz, and eventually Soviet General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan did find opportunities to
build a less acrimonious U.S.-Soviet relationship. 21 Until Gorba chev became the Soviet leader, Bush played a diplomatic role by
as is Don Oberdorfer 's The Tum (1992) and Raymond Garthoffs The Great Transition
(I 994). The single best insider account of the Reagan administration's dealing with the
Soviets comes from George Shultz's memoir, Turmoil and Triumph (1993). A more
recent insider account has been written by Jack Matlock (2004) .
21
According to Hedrick Smith (I 996, 72), Bush used one of his private weekly lunches
with Reagan to urge him to "move quickly in 1985 toward a summit meeting with ...
Gorbachev ."
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traveling to the Soviet Union on many occasions, officially representing the U.S. at the funerals of a string of General Secretaries who died in rapid succession . From Brezhnev to Andropov to
Chernenko to Gorbachev, Bush and Shultz were always on hand
to get first impressions of new Soviet leaders. Both men were
among the first to recognize that Gorbachev represented a new
kind of Soviet leader (Garthoff, 1994, 207; Shultz, 1993, 527533) .
The year 1983 proved to be a difficult and strained one for
U.S.-Soviet relations , but one in which the Vice President was to
have an impact. Shultz called 1983 "the year of the missile," and
with good reason . As part of a compact between President Carter
and allies in Europe , the United States had only a limited time to
install Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile s
and cruise missiles on the European continent. This American
action was in response to the growing number of intermediate
range Soviet missiles (SS-20 missiles) in Eastern Europe that
were pointed towards Western Europe. To make matters more
difficult , the Reagan Administration had to deal with protests
from the "freeze movement " at home in the United States and in
Europe. 22
Both the Soviets and the United States placed offers on the
table to deal with the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
problem. The Soviets would reduce their INF missiles in return
for a promise by the United States not to install its missile s in
Europe (Garthoff, 1994, 134). The United States offered what
was referred to as the "zero option ," which dictated that the U.S.
would not emplace its missiles in Europe if the Soviets removed
22

The freeze move ment called for the unilateral freezing of nuclear missi le increases by
the United States. It was hoped that such a stance would gam er a similar response from
the Sovie t Union. For a thorough discussion of the freeze move ment, see Wirls ( I 992,

I 03- 132).
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their INF missiles. Both countries saw the other's offer as making unilateral demands and, hence, as unacceptable. Given this
stalemate and the pending missile deployment in Europe, the
Soviets walked out of ongoing treaty talks with the Americans at
Geneva, Switzerland.
Vice President Bush was sent on a seven-nation European
mission at the beginning of "the year of the missile." It was intended to help contain the fears of the continent's populace,
while bolstering the concerns of the various nations' leaders. 23
Europeans were reassured that the missiles were to be deployed
for peaceful purposes and reflected Reagan's belief that the Soviets must be dealt with from positions of strength. Through the
military buildup and European INF deployments, the U.S. was
supposedly creating stronger bargaining positions. In this context, Bush's diplomatic skills proved helpful to both American
foreign policy and European leaders. According to the Washington Post, Bush "played the role of an effective public relations
man for the Reagan Administration. In private, there is also reason to believe that Bush handled himself well in his meetings
with European leaders." 24 The Washington Post editorial board
offered laudatory marks for Bush's European tour, claiming that
"George Did lt." 25 The trip did not have a strategically substantive purpose, but public relations and symbolism were important

23

Bush referred to his task as a "two-track mission ." First, Bush was to meet with
Europe ' s leaders and inform them of the President ' s support and steadfastness in having
the missiles deployed ; second , Bush needed to "stop Yuri V. Andropov , the Soviet
leader, from ' running away with U1eballgame ' in U1eheated public relations contest for
the minds of the European audience " (Clines , F. X. 1983. "The Vice President: No Comment on the Future ." New York Times, p. A-18) .
24
Getler, M . 1983. "Bush a Hit in Europe" Now Does that Help?" Washington Post, 20
February . Retrieved September 15, I 004 from LexisNexis .
25
"George Did It." 1983. Washington Post, 13 February . Retrieved September 15, 2004
from LexisNexis.
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factors in American foreign policy, particularly amidst U.S.Soviet tensions during 1983.
On a second trip to Europe in 1983, Bush was able to open a
"special channel" of communication with the Finnish government (D. Gregg, personal communication, June 3, 2005). Bush's
national security adviser, Donald Gregg, had contacts in the Finnish government, and realized that they were well versed on Soviet affairs. According to Gregg, the Finns informed him early on
that Gorbachev was a star on the rise, and that if he became the
Soviet leader, new opportunities would follow. When Bush met
with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, they both ensured that
the channel between the Vice President's office and the Finnish
President's office remained intact. As mentioned above, Bush
later met Gorbachev at Soviet leader Chernenko's funeral. Gregg
is convinced that Bush's ensuing report to Reagan regarding his
meeting with Gorbachev was important to the opening of opportunities between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (after every such trip,
Bush prepared a thorough report for the President).
Bush also used his lunch meetings to help prod Reagan towards a less confrontational posture after the downing of Korean
Air Liner 007. Bush's efforts "resulted in a speech Reagan delivered at the White House ... in which he said 'we must and will
engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as
possible. '" 26
Bush was also influential in dealing with Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, the Solidarity
26

Hoffman, D. I 986 . "Bush: Loyal Soldier Maneuvers in Private; Influenced President
on Soviets but held back Deficit Warning ," Washington Post, 28 October. Retrieved June
6, 2005 from LexisNexis . Bush dealt with the downing of KAL 007 in another capacity.
As head of the Special Situations Group, he brought the SSG together and was able to
acquire early pieces of data that were helpful to Shultz and others dealing with initial
reports on the tragedy (Garthoff, 1994, 119). The most up-to-date resource on the tragedy
is Murray Sayle's (1993) article for the New Yorkermagazine .
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union (led by Lech Walesa) was a constant burr in the side of the
communist government. The Soviet leaders and Polish president
Wojciech Jaruzelski decided to crack down on the Solidarity
movement, and Vice President Bush took the lead in urging the
President to adopt sanctions against both Poland and the USSR.
Bush did this through the use of the Special Situations Group. 27
When Shultz, who hoped to improve dialogue with the Soviet
Union, became Secretary of State, he asked that an interdepartmental Saturday breakfast be established. For that, NSA
Mcfarlane turned to his assistant for Soviet matters, Jack
Matlock, to create the group that would have on-going and open
discussions about Soviet foreign policy. Along with Weinberger,
DCI Casey, Shultz, and their assistants, Bush "participated actively and usefully in many of the group's meetings" (Matlock,
2004, 75). Moreover, Bush served a useful function in keeping
Shultz plugged into the inner workings of the White House
(Shultz, 1993 312,317,423). According to Bush's national security adviser, Donald Gregg (personal communication, June 3,
2005), Gregg met regularly with a confidante of Secretary of
State George Shultz, Charles Hill. Gregg felt that this was a
valuable information resource for both Bush and Shultz. After
each meeting Gregg reported everything to Bush. 28
Throughout the remainder of the Reagan Administration, and
with the rise to power of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the chances of confrontation with the U.S.S.R. and nu27

Weisman, S. R. I 982. '·Bush Prizes his Behmd-the-Scenes innuence," New York

Times, 28 February, p. I+.
28

Bush also worked with, and through, NSA McFarlane: "Early in 1984, when hard-line
and more pragmatic factions in the Administration were at odds over what approach it
should take, Mr. Bush worked with Robert C. McFarlane... to move Mr. Reagan to a less
hostile view of Moscow" (Boyd, G. M. 1987. "Issue for '88: Who is George Bush?" .Yew
York Times, November 20. Retrieved February 11, 2004 from LexisNexis). There was a
closeness between McFarlane and Bush that added lo Bush's ability to maintain a backchannel innuence in foreign policy (Timberg, I 995, 369).
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clear holocaust diminished greatly. 29 There were still difficulties
ahead for U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Reagan's insistence on
moving forward with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
which was supposed to provide a shield over the U.S. against
nuclear attack, proved to be a difficult negotiating barrier between Reagan and Gorbachev. At the same time, SDI aligned
perfectly with Reagan's detestation of nuclear weapons and his
desire to see the world rid of them. During the second summit
between Reagan and Gorbachev, in Reykjavik , Iceland in 1986,
the superpowers came remarkably close to removing their entire
nuclear arsenals , but Reagan's desire to maintain SDI prevented
an agreement. Interestingly, although Bush did not care for the
conservative hard-line of the first term, he also did not care for
what he saw as excessive naivete in Reagan's willingness to deal
away too many missiles: it seemed to him unlikely that the world
could safely dismantle much of its nuclear stockpiles
(Oberdorfer, 1992, 329). However, during his own presidency,
Bush continued working on different variations of missile defense.30 In any event, SDI was not an insurmountable issue;
Reagan and Gorbachev came to important agreements on the
reduction of nuclear forces toward the end of Reagan's second
term. As vice president (and later as president), Bush played important parts as the United States saw one of its greatest foreign

29
At around the time of Gorbachev 's rise to the office of General Secretary , Reagan was
deciding to minimize the number of people he consulted with on US-Soviet foreign policy: " I would consult only with a small group-George
Bush, George Shultz, Cap
Weinberger, and Bud McFarlane ... in the National Security Planning Group to determine
whether we could develop a long-range plan that offered the Russians a series of small
steps, and showed that we were sincere about wanting to improve relations as a prelud e to
a summit and hoped they were, too" (Reagan, 1990, 594-595) .
30
Vice President Quayle's national security adviser , Carnes Lord, credited Quayle and
his staff with effectively influencing Bush Administration policy on missile defense (C.
Lord, personal communication, May 24, 2005) .
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The 1,900 American military service members made fairly
quick work of the island, though not without difficulties. Among
the many problems U.S. forces encountered was faulty intelligence about the enemy's defense preparedness. Also , there were
poor communications among the various branches deployed on
or around the island. When all the firing stopped, eighteen service members were killed and the U.S . was triumphant (Rosati,
2004, 72). Parmet (2001, 285) wrote that "Bush did not exactly
'o rchestrate' the invasion ... but he certainly was at the heart of
the planning operation .... More significantly for Bush in the long
run was his ringside seat at the creation of the first significant
combat deployment since Vietnam." 32
The apparent success of the Grenada invasion could not have
come at a more needed time for the Reagan Administration. As
decisions for the invasion were being made, news arrived that a
deployment of U.S. forces (mostly marines) in Lebanon suffered
the loss of 241 men who were instantly killed when a terrorist
drove a bomb-laden truck into their housing facility
(Huchthausen, 2003, 59). American forces had been placed in
Lebanon in August, 1982, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion
of southern Lebanon earlier in the year. A strong Syrian presence
in the country, along with the multi-religious complexities existing in Beirut, added to the normally high tensions in the Middle
Eastern region. With Beirut slipping into chaos, President
Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz decided to intervene. A
multi-national force, led by the United States, was deployed to
32

For a brief analysis of the prob lems encountered by U.S. forces in Grenada, see Rosati
(2004, 172); also see Huchthausen (2003, 65-85) . As for Bush 's role, Gerald Boyd of the
New York Times wrote the following : "As chainnan of Mr. Reagan 's ' crisis management '
team , Mr. Bush played a far greater role in the invasion of Grenada in October 1983 than
was publicly disclosed at the time . With the President in Augusta , Ga., Mr. Bush convened a meeting of top-level officials, recommend ed the military action and then conveyed the proposal to Mr. Reagan, who concurred " (" Issue for '88: Who is George
Bush?" New York Times, November 20 . Retrieved February 11, 2004 from LexisNexis).
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policy triumphs unfold: the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet
Union"
GRENADA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND OTHER EVENTS

As chairman of the Special Situations Group, Bush playe d an
important role in one of the Reagan Administration's early military ventures, Grenada. A small Caribbean island nation, Grenada expe1ienced two coups. A radically anti-American, proCuban government was the result. Also, almost 600 Amer ican
citizens were on the island as students at a local medical school.
At the time the decision was made for American forces to invade
in October 1983, Reagan was on a golf trip in Augusta , Georgia .
Bush convened the National Security Council and received word
from the President to proceed with the invasion. According to
Herbe11 Parmet (2001, 284), "Bush, never hesitant as other senior officials, then telephoned Noriega [leader of Panama] to ask
Castro to abandon any idea of countering by sending in Cuban
troops."

31

There are many theories regarding the changing relationship between the United Slates
and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Many conservatives prefer to credit
Reagan with maintaining a tough posture towards the Soviets: his military buildup forced
the Soviets to the bargaining table (for examp le, see Schweizer, 1994, 2002). Others
prefer to credit Gorbachev and the changing intellectual climate in the Soviet Union
(English, 2000); also, Garthoff found Reagan's pronouncements and actions to be anything but helpful in working with the Soviet Union, particularly when Gorbachev had to
face the growing domestic problems in his country (Garthoff, 1994). Beth Fischer pointed
out that Reagan's position changed dramatically from that of a tough and uncompro mising cold warrior, to a more congenially willing participant in negotiations (Fisc her,
1997). Jack Matlock, who worked in the Reagan Administration, found that the end of
the Cold War was bigger than the two main players . Contrary to Fischer 's argument,
Matlock claims that Reagan was always consistent, and unique, in his desire to work with
the Soviets. Finally, Melvyn Leffler credits the Truman administration for instituting the
tough policies necessary to confront the growing Soviet threat; subsequent admi nistrations followed Truman's lead (1992, 27-28; Leffler, 2004).
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the region . As has often been the case in American national security politics, the entire Administration was not on the same page.
Secretary of Defen se Casper Weinberger believed that American
forces should not have been deployed to Lebanon (1990, 157158)."
Bush's opinion on whether or not the United States shou ld
have provided American troops to secure Lebanon remains a
mystery; however, after the bombing of the marines ' barracks,
Bush ardently supporte d pulling the U.S. forces out. Much to the
consternation of Shultz, Bush actively lobbied the President. In
fact, while the President was in California, "Vice President Bush,
with Cap Weinberger at his side, convened a series of cris ismanagement meetings out of which came decision s to move up
and condense the schedule for departure of the marines with no
compensating dep loyment. ... The vice president said that there is
nothing more important than getting those marines out" (Shu ltz,
1993, 230-231 ). This was certainly not a foreign policy vict ory
for the United States, but Bush's role in the Lebanon-American
forces pull-out was evident.
Crises were not the only area of foreign policy involvement
for George Bush. He also acted on foreign economic issues. For
example, early in the first term, Bush was placed in charge of
helping the President prepare for a western economic summit in
Canada .34 In another area of importance for foreign economic
33

Weinberger's beliefs as to when American soldie rs should be deployed abroad were
better kno",n as the Weinberger Doctrine (which would become more well known as the
Powell Doctrine, after Colin Powell) : ·'we should not commi t American troops to any
situation unless objectives were so important to American interests that we had to fight,
and that if those conditions were met, and all diplomatic efforts failed, then we had to
commit, as a last resort, not just token forces to provide an American presence, but
enough forces to win and win overw helmingly" (Weinberger, 1990, 159-160). For a
helpful and concise review of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, see Rosati (2004, 188).
34
Rosellini , L. 1981. "Working Profile : George Bush ; Behind the Scenes is Fine, he
says," New York Times, 28 October, p. A-20. Smith, H. 1981. "Bush says he Soug ht to
Note continues on next page .
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policy, Japanese automotive imports, Bush offered to Reagan the
idea that Japan "voluntarily" reduce their auto exports. Reagan
liked the idea and had Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield
suggest it to the Japanese government (Reagan, 1990, 254;
Rosellini, 1981). After Reagan traveled to Japan in 1983, Bush
was placed in charge of a task force to ensure that agreements
between the two nations were carried out; in leading the task
force, Bush dealt directly with Japan's Prime Minister Nakasone
(Shultz, 1993, 190).
Although Bush benefited from the semi-institutionalized vice
presidency, he also made an important change to it: unlike Vice
President Mondale, Bush did not refrain from specific assignments. One such assignment was Bush's supervision of an antiterrorism task force. Unfortunately, as evidenced by future
events like Iran-Contra, the recommendations based on Bush's
work were not followed. 35 Bush also supervised the South Florida
Task Force, which was formed in 1982 to address the increased
amounts of marijuana and cocaine entering the U.S. Although
Bush was able to bring together diverse elements of the U.S. bureaucracy in the war on drugs, over time cocaine increasingly
entered the country and became more affordable (Parmet, 2001,
265 ; Rothenberg, 1988). Still, Bush made an important contribution to the precedents of the semi-institutional vice presidency by
establishing that specific assignments need not hinder a vice
president's general advisory ability. His successors, Quayle ,

Avoid Acting like a Surrogate President," New York Times, 12 April, pp. 1 & 28. Weisman, S. R. 1982. "Bush Prizes his Behind-the-ScenesInfluence," New York Times, p. 1+.
35
One of the stronger statements from Bush's task force eerily foreshadowed the Reagan
administration's biggest scandal: "The U.S. government will make no concessions to
terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies, or agree to other
acts which might encourage additional terrorism" (Parrnet, 200 I, 265).
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Gore, and Cheney, took on specific, and sometimes vital, assignments. 36
Clearly, Bush played an important diplomatic role for the
Reagan Administration. He traveled 1.3 million miles as vice
president and visited 74 countries. According to Kenneth Walsh
(1988) of U. S. News & World Report, Bush familiarized himse lf
with virtually every major head of state, ranging from Mikha il
Gorbachev to China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaping .... Bush's
closest friends in world capitals included Canada's Brian Mul roney, Britain's Margaret Thatcher and West Germany's He lmut
Kohl, and he has a strong bond with France's Francois Mitterand. Without fanfare, Bush has hosted heads of state such as
President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire and Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew of Singapore.
CENTRAL AMERICAAND

IRAN-CONT RA

Ironically, the best place to uncover Vice President Bush's active involvement in foreign policy is in the one area he would
prefer no one looked: the Iran-Contra scandal. The largest presidential controversy since Nixon's Watergate, Iran-Contra captured the nation's attention at a time when Bush least wanted the
issue to bubble up in November 1986, since he was about to
launch his second run for the presidency. Although the vice
president's role in foreign po licy has dramatically increase d, especially since Walter Mondale, the increased stature has not often translated into a promotion to the presidency. Not since
Martin Van Buren in 1836 had a sitting vice president bee n
36

For example , Gore ' s national security adviser , Leon Fuerth, pointed out that Gore ' s
leadership on four bi-national commissions with Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, and
Egypt all produced positive results for the United States (L. Fuerth, personal communication, May 11, 2005). Also, Cheney was placed in charge of the G.W. Bush transition
effort in 2000/2001 , and he was responsible for assessing the nation ' s terrorism preparedness prior to the 9/ l l attacks (Lechelt, 2004, 24, 26).
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elected president. 37 Bush did win the presidential election of
1988, but Iran-Contra was certainly not a help to him.
To better understand Bush's role in Iran-Contra and the scandal, it is important to consider earlier, and related, issues. First
and foremost there is Panama and its leader Manuel Noriega. 38
As vice president, Bush had minimal contact with Noriega, who
took control of Panama in 1983. But in late 1983, while Bush
was traveling to Argentina for the swearing in of a new president, his national security advisor, Donald Gregg, and the soonto-be-infamous Oliver North, accompanied the Vice President as
they stopped in Panama to tell Noriega to cease helping Salvadoran death squads. The death squads were led by right-wing
militants who were aggressively anti-communist. Of course, the
vehement anti-communist position of the squads accommodated
Reagan's own policy preferences, but it is difficult to argue for
the human rights benefits of rejecting communism when those
fighting communism are not respecting human rights. Hence the
Bush warning to Noriega, one later made to leaders in El Salvador as well (Parmet, 2001, 285-286). 39 Gregg states that Bush
37
In I 960 , Richard Nixon, as Eisenhower ' s vice president, ran for president and lost to
John F. Kennedy; but Nixon was elected president in 1968.
38
Bush ' s connections to Noriega stretched back to 1976, when Bush was Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) and learned that Noriega, then head of Panama's intelligence
agency, was spying on Americans in Panama; the Americans were, in tum, spying on the
Panamanian government (Engelberg , S. I 988 . "Bush and Noriega : Examination of Their
Ties ," New York Times, 28 September . Retrieved February I I, I 004 from LexisNexis ).
Central America, as with most regions of the world, was considered more important to
American interests because of the Cold War. Communist forces were supposedly infiltrating many countries in the region, and Noriega was then considered a friend in the
ongoing Cold War chess game. With all of that in mind, DCI Bush was not eager to go
afier Noriega for spying activities.
39
Bush traveled to other Central and South American nations, always carrying the
Reagan Doctrine message that "The United States believes in the self-determination of
peoples .. . . It also believes in nonintervention. But it cannot and will not sit by while
foreign powers-hostile
to the principles we in the Americas have struggled so long
for-intervene brutally :n the international affairs of one of our neighbors " (Parmet ,
Note continues on next page.
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dealt "with death squads in El Salvador in just a tremendously
powerful way ... calling the military leaders in and just absolutely
berating them" (D. Gregg, personal communication, June 3,
2005). Bush's impact on the situation in El Salvador appeared to
pay off as the list of demands the Vice President gave to Salvadoran leaders was mostly met by early January 1984: "a new
military command was installed; some military officers who had
been linked with death squads were transferred, allowing the
authorities to get a grip on the free-lance vigilantes· and the army
stood back and let the political process unfold" (Gutman, 1988,
185).•0
Eventually, the Reagan team recognized the difficulties of
dealing with Noriega. Towards the end of the Administration,
and with Bush fully engaged in 1988 campaign politics , the Vice
President vehemently argued with President Reagan over the
handling of the Panamanian leader. In February 1988, federal
prosecutors indicted Noriega for his drug-smuggling activities.
Reagan, however, was willing to compromise: if Noriega would
resign his control over the Panamanian government and leave the
country, President Reagan was willing to lift sanctions against
Panama and waive indictments against Noriega. In the presence
of other Administration officials, Bush spoke up against the
President (Parmet, 2001, 332; Powell & Persico, 1995, 375). The
deal was not carried out, and Bush would have to wait until he

2001, 287). The Reagan Doctrine sought the "'rollback of Soviet influence in the third
world" - particularly Central America, but also in Afghanistan (Gutman, 1988, 268). .
Gregg (persona l com munication , June 3, 2005) also pointed out that Bush's tough talk
to the Salvadorans helped him in a second 1983 trip to Europe. The rise of El Salvado r on
the U.S. agenda and the resulting media coverage of the death squads made Europea n
allies weary. Bush let the Europeans know that the U.S. was addressing the situation and
would not tolerate death squads (Feldman , L. 1983. "B ush Defends Policy on Central
America ," Christian Science Monitor . 28 June . Nordheimer , J. 1983. "Bush in London ,
Gives Latin Views ," New York Times, 25 June . Retrieved June 6, 2005 from LexisNexis) .
40
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was president in order to see Noriega's forced removal from
power.
In hindsight, perhaps Bush should have argued similarly
against the various issues that were labeled under the "IranContra" rubric. As for the Contra side of the scandal, Nicaragua
was the focal point for the majority of the problems the United
States faced in Central America during the Reagan years. At the
end of the Carter presidency, the dictator of Nicaragua, General
Anastasio Somoza, was overthrown by the Sandinista National
Liberation Front led largely by Daniel Ortega. Ortega and the
Sandinistas had leftist leanings that were further cemented when
Ortega gained control of the Sandinistas and, hence, the new
government. Although Carter made goodwill economic aid gestures to the new government, Ortega embraced the Soviet Union.
With the entrance of the Reagan Administration in January 1981,
a more confrontational approach to the Sandinistas was adopted.
Reagan wanted to repel the Sandinistas by funding counterrevolutionaries (or "Contrarrevolucionarios," and their betterknown nomenclature, "Contras"). The Contras were a loose network associated with the former Somoza regime and other fighters who opposed the Sandinistas. The conservatives in the
Reagan Administration admired the Contras and wanted to support their fight against the communist-leaning government
(Draper, 1991, 15-16).41
41

The Iran-Contra affair has generated no shortage of investigations. The most infom1ative and thorough account of the entire affair is Theodore Draper's A Very Thin Line
Draper, Theodore . (1991 .) . Another useful account that focuses on the Nicaragua aspect
is Roy Gutman, .Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua,
198/-/987 . New York: Simon and Schuster (1998). The United States Government, in
many different capacities, thoroughly investigated the Iran-Contra affair. First, the
Reagan administration appointed an in-house effort led by Attorney General Ed Meese .
Then, realizing there was a larger public clamor for a more thorough investigation, the
President appointed a commission led by former Senator John Tower (after whom the
commission is more commonly known, the Tower Commission) . After that, the President
Note continues on next page .
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Interestingly , the "Contra" in the Iran-Contra affair actually
preceded the Iran part of the scandal. The Iran-hostage aspect
presented itself a bit later in the Reagan presidency (Draper,
1991, 3). With the fall of the Shah of Iran during the Carter Administration, the new radical rulers of the Muslim nation had
established ties to other militant Muslim groups throughout the
Middle Eastern region , and some of those groups dealt in terrorism. One such terrorist group, Hizballah , maintained operations
in Lebanon and was responsible for the kidnapping of Americans
working at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. One of those kidnapped
was William A. Buckley, the CIA station chief in Lebanon, and
this especially bothered Bush , who was a former CIA Director
(Parmet, 2001, 305).
As a means of getting the hostages released in Lebanon and
making inroads with a supposed moderate element in Iran, a plan
was devised of almost comical (and tragic) proportions. As with
the Contra initiative, conservative elements working largely out
of the National Security Council Staff and CIA believed that the
hostages could be released if the Iranian government applied
pressure to the Hizballah terrorists in Lebanon. Many believed
that the most effective means of getting the Iranians to apply this
pressure was by providing them with weapons for their ongoing
war with Iraq.
As mentioned above , the NSC Staff was the main coordinating arm of both aspects of Iran-Contra, with assistance from DCI
William Casey. The two NSAs who were the main coordinators
for the Iran and Contra initiatives were, first, Bud McFarlane ,
and then John Poindexter (who also served as McFarlane 's deputy NSA). The man destined to rise as the focus of attention for
appointed an independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, to investigate whether or not any
laws were broken . Finally, Congress also produc ed reports based on their invest igations :
one for the majority Democrats , and one for the minority Republicans .
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the Iran-Contra investigations was Lt. Col. Oliver North . He was
the main point-man on the NSC staff for both the Iran and Contra initiatives, and for the fateful linking of both aspects , which
was the diversion of profits from the sale of arms to Iran to help
the Contras in Nicaragua . Officially, North was the deputy direc tor for political-military affairs of the National Security Council
staff; in actuality, North was the glue holding the scandal-to-be
together, along with McFarlane and Poindexter.
Aside from believing both approaches unwise , Secretary of
State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger also feared
that the initiatives might have been illegal. With regard to funding the Contras, legality was certainly in question : Congress had
passed a few bills , all of which the President signed into law,
containing restrictions on the flow of money to the Contras. Democrats in Congress wanted the Administration to utilize diplomacy in dealing with Ortega and the Sandinista government. The
Democrats feared that military force could slip out of control and
engulf neighboring countries like Honduras, El Salvador, and
Costa Rica. Also adding to frustrations in Congress was one particular semi-military operation led by the CIA, namely , the mining of Nicaraguan harbors to prevent the flow of oil from
benefiting the Sandinistas . Congress was outraged. Even staunch
Republican Senator Barry Goldwater , chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, was angry with the CIA (Gutman,
1988).
Because of the Congressional restrictions , North sought to
continue funding the Contras by employing some imaginative
schemes to maintain the money flow. First , he contacted other
governments and asked them to help out. Saudi Arabia contributed $32 million and Taiwan another $2 million. Second , there
were the contributions of private citizens, which came to $1.7
million. Finally, proceeds from sales of arms to Iran were diverte d to the Contras (L. E. Walsh, 1994, 447) .
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And so, in all of this, where was Vice President Bush? Depending on when the question was asked, his response almost
literally varied from "everyw here" to "now here." In a Business
Week interview held just a few months before the Iran initiative
became a public controversy in November 1986, Bush claimed
he was deeply involved in Administration policy: 'Tm in on everything. If our policies aren't working, I can't say, 'Wa it a minute, I'm not to blame '" (1986). Even in his own diary regarding
Iran-Contra, Bush claimed that he was "one of the few people
that know fully the details" (L. E. Walsh, 1994, 480, fn 474). Yet
in his autobiography (1988, 238), written after Iran-Contra was
center-stage in public debate, Bush wrote that "I'd been deliberately excluded from key meetings involving details of the Iran
operation" and did not have a "rea l chance to see the picture as a
whole" (see also Draper, 1993, 54). He also bluntly stated that he
was "o ut of the loop" (Shultz, 1993, 809).
In dealings with the Iranian initiative, Bush was present for
practically every meeting of importance among Reagan's top
national security advisors. This included the first meeting in
1985 in which it was agreed that the United States was to replenish Israeli missile stockpiles after Israel sold missiles to Iran. At
another meeting on January 7, 1986, Shultz and Weinberger, two
Administration officials who rarely agreed on anything, both
stated quite clearly that they were opposed to the Iran initiative.
George Bush was present for these important meetings, and although his positions were not clearly stated, his silence was understood to mean agreement with the President's position of
42
continuing arms-for-hostages efforts. Furthermore, according to

42

Shultz stated that " it was clear to me ... that the President , the Vice President , the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Chief of Staff, the National Security
Advisor all had one opinion and I had a di!Terent one and Cap shared it" (Tower , Muskie,
& Scowcrofl, 1987, 225) .
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Draper (1993, 54), "It is on record that Reagan , Bush, and the
chief of staff met every morning at 9 AM, and Reagan, Bush, and
the national security adviser met at 9:30 AM, whenever Bush
was in Washington, which was most of the time. At these meetings Reagan invariably brought up the hostages. "
Bush not only served as presidential confidante and advisor
for Iran issues, he also acted as an ambassador on behalf of the
policy. In fact, on one overseas trip, Bush met with a close advisor to then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in July 1986.
Israel was in the middle of the arms for hostages swap in the
early stages: Israel shipped its weapons to Iran, and the U.S. restocked Israel 's missile supply. Amiram Nir was Israel's go-to
official for dealing with Iranian issues, and his official title wa s
"Special Assistant on Counterterrorism " to the Prime Minister .
The meeting was relatively brief and various accounts of its importance exist in the public record. Bush (1988, 239-240) described it as nothing more than a " listening session" on his part
and felt that it only supplied "pieces" to a larger puzzle . Bush 's
Chief of Staff, Craig Fuller, recorded however a far more detailed briefing given by Nir. If Bush claimed to know little about
the arms-for-hostages deal up until that meeting , he could hardly
make that claim after the meeting. Nir laid it all out on the table
by describing the logic of selling arms to Iran. As noted by
Fuller, "the VP made no commitments nor did he give any direction to Nir" (Tower et al., 1987, 389). But Bush's report of the
meeting helped the President decide to resume arms sales to Iran
(L. E. Walsh, 1994, 480) .
In November 1986, after the media got hold of the arms-for hostages story, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador
to the United States, came to the White House to meet with
Bush. Bandar was concerned that publication of the story was
going to force U.S . policy to change regarding Iran; Bu sh assured the Saudi ambassador that there would be no change .
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Theodore Draper (1993, 56) noted that "if Bush took it upon
hims elf to give such assurances to Bandar, he was clearly privy
to all or at least enough of what had been going on in the Administration's highest circles. In fact, it is significant that Bandar
should have sought out Bush for an answer. "
As Bush fulfilled important roles on the Middle Eastern/Iranian side of the Iran-Contra scandal, he was also involved
in supporting the Contras of Central America. First and foremost,
Bush strongly favored the efforts made to acquire third party
funding for the Contras, as long as no quid-pro-quo agreemertts
were made for the funds. 43 Hence, although a complete and accurate understanding of the Iran-Contra scandal may never be
known , there is no mistaking that George Bush was a major part
44
of this foreign policy fiasco.

"' Also, two members of Bush 's staff-national security advisor Donald Gregg and deputy national security advisor Col. Samuel J. Watson 111--played significant roles, again
providing evidence of Bush 's impact on Reagan 's foreign polic y. Gregg and Watson
were closely connected with the Contra activities through their contact, Felix Rodriguez .
Rodriguez 's main role in the Contra supply effort was his work with the Salvadora n Air
Force . After a Contra-re-supply plane was shot down in Cen tral America with an American on board , the U.S. media found out that the night was sponsored by the C IA, with
Rodrigue z providing another link between shady activities and the upper-echelons of the
White House (Walsh, 1994, 485).
44
MmTay Waas and Craig Unger (1992) wrote of a Bush- Casey con nection that has received scant attention elsewhere . During the 1980s, while the arms-for-hostages affair
was ongoing, Iran was engaged in a lengthy eight-year war with Iraq, a nation then ruled
by Saddam Hussein . According to Waas and Unger, Bush was part of a Casey-devised
plan to continually balance the abilities of Iran and Iraq against each other on the theory
that those two countries could best be occupied by a lengthy war between them. Accord ing to Waas and Unger, Bush was able to balance the factions within the Reaga n Administration, one of which favored Iraq, the other favoring Iran. If Waas and Unger are
accurate , and they term the affair " Iragqate ," Bush played a very important role in bolstering Iraq against Iran.
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CONCLUSION

Vice President George Bush was an active and influential
force on Reagan's foreign policy team. As a presidential advisor,
Congressional liaison, diplomat-at-large, and as a leader of certain specific tasks and responsibilities such as the Special Situations Group, Bush took part in all of the major foreign policy
issues of the Reagan Administration. Bush was able to do this in
part because of his competence and the wishes of his President ,
but also because of the semi-institutionalization of the vice presidency. It was President Carter and Vice President Mondale who
together established a variety of precedents augmenting the
prominence , power and resources of vice presidents . Those
precedents included a vice presidential office in the West Wing,
weekly private lunches between the president and vice president ,
inclusion of the vice president in the paperwork loop, the freedom of the vice president or a member of his staff to attend virtually all presidential and national security meetings , and the
continuance of a substantive budget line-item and staff resource s
for the office. President Reagan and Vice President Bush maintained those precedents. In fact, Bush added a precedent of his
own: he proved that a vice president could take on specific and
important assignments without diminishing his general advisory
status or influence. The precedents established by Carter/Mondale,
and reinforced by Reagan/Bush, have persisted through to the
current day.
The vice presidency is a unique office, as are the individual s
who fill it. Although the office has increased resources , it does
not come close to what Cabinet Secretaries possess. Further more, there are few legal guidelines dictating how the vice presidency should be utilized. But as with important increases in
presidential power, precedents have filled in where the law has
been silent. In The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlessinger
(1973) pointed out that the power relationship between the presiVOL. 33 2005
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dent and Congress has shifted back and forth over the years, with
the presidency making net gains overall. Likewise, the semiinstitutional vice presidency recognizes that every vice president
will not have the same influence as Mondale or Bush: some will
have more and others will have less. Presidents have options in
determining how they will use their vice presidents, and vice
presidents will at times help or hinder their standing within an
administration. However, the pre-Mondale vice president will
now be the exception, rather than the rule.
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